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Burma's Iron 'Aunty'

Aung San Suu Kyi's Steely Will Keeps a Country's Hopes Alive
By Ellen Nakashima Washington Post Foreign Service, BANGKOK - October 13, 2003

Aunty, run! Run!

The horrified young bodyguards screamed for the slender woman they were escorting through the Burmese night to make a break for it. Hundreds of angry assailants were swarming her motorcade of democracy activists, smashing her truck's window and jabbing sharpened bamboo sticks inside. But the beloved leader of Burma's democracy movement -- Aung San Suu Kyi, affectionately called "Aunty" -- refused to budge that day, May 30, on what has become known as Black Friday.

The mob, recruited by Burma's military regime, dragged off Suu Kyi's elderly deputy. They jerked women out of the trucks, stripping several naked and bashing one's head on the road. Scores of activists, maybe more than 100, were killed or injured.

"They are killing our mother!" the activists shouted, referring again to Suu Kyi.

"She refused to run," recalls Wunna Maung, a 26-year-old bodyguard. Her driver finally floored the gas pedal and rocketed them out of the fray.

But Suu Kyi was captured less than two miles away. For almost four months, she was held incommunicado in an undisclosed location. She was returned home Sept. 26, to house arrest yet again -- she has spent almost eight of the last 14 years detained.

The international community demands her freedom. The United States has imposed economic sanctions on Burma. This petite, fragile-looking 58-year-old woman with blossoms woven in her hair, a "prettier version of Mahatma Gandhi," one friend calls her, has become the sole repository for the Burmese people's hopes.

She chose this burden, this unimaginable weight. She once had a comfortable intellectual life in Europe, but a remarkable confluence of events, of people, led her back to a harder path.

A Name and a Destiny

Perhaps he knew it would make a difference. In Burma, where parents almost never name their children after themselves, Gen. Aung San, the country's founding father, broke with all tradition. Not only did he name his first two sons after himself, Aung San Oo and Aung San Lin, he gave his name to his only daughter. Aung San is a muscular name, one that means victory.

To add softness and balance, he drew from his mother's name, Suu, and from his wife's name, Kyi. Strung together like pearls, the name, Aung San Suu Kyi (pronounced "Ong Sahn Soo Chee"), is an unusual name, meaning a bright collection of strange victories.

The child was aware of the weight of her name, even a bit embarrassed by its length and masculine sound. But as she grew, she would become ever more aware of the power of her name, and the destiny it carried.

There is a striking reverse symmetry in the lives of the father and the daughter. The youngest of six children, Gen. Aung San was born of rural gentry, and though late to speak and with an awkward, even prickly, personality, he grew into a student leader and committed nationalist. Even as a child, he dreamed of driving the British out of his country, colonized in the 19th century. He would go on to form the Burma Independence Army, to become one of the legendary Thirty Comrades trained secretly by the Japanese. They reentered Burma with the Japanese invasion to oust the British in early 1942, then turned around in March 1945 and helped the British end Japanese occupation.

But this grand hero's service to the Burmese people was cut sorrowfully short: A jealous rival had him gunned down in 1947 -- just six months before Burma declared its independence. He was only 32. Suu Kyi was 2.

As she grew, the daughter, whose brisk gestures, direct speech and bright eyes made her a "female replica" of the general, would become obsessed with knowing more about the father she had lost. When she was a young mother, living in Oxford, England, she'd occasionally meet former British colonials who had served in Burma at the end of the war.

Did they know Gen. Aung San? What was he like? What did he look like? "One of them said, 'He did look a little like Yul Brynner,' which she liked quite a lot," recalled Peter Carey, a close friend and a Southeast Asia historian at Oxford. "I think she always had this incredible sort of daughter's hero worship for her father, considering the father he was."

As fate would have it, she would pick up where he left off decades later, when she was 43, forming a party, the National League for Democracy, with two of his former comrades in arms.

During her long, often lonely struggle, she has said, "I always think, 'I may be alone, but I know I have your backing.' "

A Time of Uncertainty

Though she would have preferred literature or forestry, Suu Kyi was accepted into a program of philosophy, politics and economics at St. Hugh's College in Oxford. It was the mid-'60s. In Burma, a military coup had just begun an era of repressive rule. On the British campus, wearing the traditional Burmese lungi, or sarong, Suu Kyi stood out for her exotic beauty and her unwavering morals. She once told amused college mates that she would never sleep with anyone except her husband, preferring to "just go to bed hugging my pillow," recalled former classmate Ann Pasternak Slater.

"Oh, you must come and see this remarkable Burmese woman at St. Hugh's!" Anthony Aris exclaimed to his twin brother, Michael Aris, a Tibetan scholar at the University of Durham in northern England.

Michael was smitten, but Suu Kyi had "no ideas about being taken by anybody at that time," recalled Ma Than E, a family friend whom Suu Kyi likes to call her "emergency aunt."

After college and a spell in London, Suu Kyi moved to New York in 1969 to work at the United Nations as staff for an advisory budget committee. She shared a 17th-floor sublet overlooking the East River with Ma Than E, who worked at the U.N. Secretariat.

It was then that Michael Aris's courtship began in earnest, by correspondence. He was by now in Bhutan, serving as tutor to the royal family. He wanted to marry her. Suu Kyi wrote him 187 letters, at times expressing a worry that her family and country might misconstrue their marriage as a weakening of her bond to them. She made clear that one day she might have to return to Burma.

"I only ask one thing," she wrote in one letter, "that should my people need me, you would help me to do my duty by them."

He promised he would support her, should she be called to serve. They married at a mutual friend's London home on New Year's Day 1972. After a time in Bhutan, they returned to England. Two sons followed: Alexander and Kim, named after the hero of the Kipling tale.

The family moved to Oxford when Michael became a research fellow at St. John's College. As her sons grew, she began to devote more time to her own passion, Asian literature. But a deep curiosity about her roots grew, turning into a focused effort to research her father and her country's history. She decided to write a biography of her father. In 1985, she spent a year in Kyoto, and in 1987, a year in New Delhi, doing research.

As Carey saw it, she was in search of a role. Michael was a dedicated scholar of Tibet. "She hadn't yet found her true calling," Carey said. "It was a time of uncertainty."

She wanted a higher level of achievement for both herself and her husband, recalled Pasternak Slater. "I think that created a certain amount of anxiety in her," said Pasternak Slater. "There was a restlessness in her life."

One thing not on her mind, at least overtly, was a career in Burmese politics.

Fate intervened on March 31, 1988, with a phone call from Rangoon to Oxford. Her mother, Daw Khin Kyi, had suffered a severe stroke. Suu Kyi put the phone down and began to pack. "I had a premonition," Michael wrote in the introduction to a collection of essays
about his wife, "that our lives would change forever."

A Life-Changing Speech

By the time she arrived in Rangoon, there was already an electricity in the air. The students had taken to the streets, and in one incident, 41 wounded students suffocated in a police van.

Michael and the boys joined Suu Kyi that summer at her mother's home, a weathered villa on Inya Lake. The family sat transfixed before the television on July 23. Gen. Ne Win announced that he was resigning and that a referendum on the country's political future would be held. Suu Kyi, like the country, was elated. Here, at last, was the people's chance to take control of their destiny.

"I think it was at this moment more than any other that Suu made up her mind to step forward," Michael wrote in the introduction to "Freedom from Fear."

At 8:08 a.m. on Aug. 8, 1988 -- known as the "Four Eights," or 8/8/88, a date the Burmese had chosen for its numerological significance -- a nationwide pro-democracy strike was called. Hundreds of thousands of students, civil servants and monks poured into the streets, ecstatic with the prospect of an end to one-party rule. Around midnight, President Sein Lwin ordered troops to fire.

In the aftermath, Suu Kyi wrote an open letter to the government, proposing a committee be formed to take the country toward multiparty elections. Then she wrote a speech that was to propel her onto the political stage.

By midday on Aug. 26, a sea of people had flooded the slope beneath the Shwedagon Pagoda, whose golden cup and spire tower over Rangoon. Suu Kyi stood on a stage at the pagoda's base. People climbed trees to snatch a glimpse of Aung San's daughter.

Despite rumors of an assassination attempt, she refused to wear a bulletproof vest. Fellow activist Nyo Ohn Myint drove Michael to the pagoda. It would be the first time his wife would give such a public speech.

"Revered monks and people! This public rally is aimed at informing the whole world of the will of the people," she began. ". . . Our purpose is to show that the entire people entertain the keenest desire for a multiparty democratic system of government."

She called the national crisis, in the speech's most memorable phrase, "the second struggle for national independence." The crowd, 100,000 strong, roared.

Amid the jubilation, Nyo Ohn Myint noticed Michael, standing to the side. He was clearly proud, but he also wore a look, the activist recalled, "kind of like, I'm going to lose my wife and my privacy and my family." On the drive back, people in the car were "amazed, excited." Michael was silent, lost in thought.

The army cracked down again, killing thousands. On Sept. 18, martial law was declared. The ruling military junta named itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which birthed the beast-evoking acronym SLORC (in 1997, on the advice of a public relations firm, it would rename itself the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC).

The democracy activists formed their party, the National League for Democracy. Suu Kyi became general secretary and U Tin Oo -- the elderly deputy -- eventually chairman. They began to campaign for the promised national elections.

Suu Kyi's mother died that December. She was 75. More than 100,000 people watched her funeral procession. Suu Kyi, who had learned stoicism and strict control over emotions from her, soldiered on.

In April 1989, Suu Kyi and a group of NLD activists set off on a campaign trip along the Irrawaddy River, stopping at villages along the way. On the second day, they alighted from their boat and began the short walk to the party office in the town of Danubyu.

Suddenly, soldiers blocked their way. Kneeling, six or seven soldiers pointed automatic rifles at them: Stop!

"Keep moving," Suu Kyi told her group, recalled Nyo Ohn Myint. He tried to get in front of Suu Kyi to protect her. "No," she said, holding him back. "You don't need to. It makes them more nervous."

Calmly, the 5-foot-3 Suu Kyi spoke out to the soldiers: Let us pass. We have no other road.

Just then, a major rushed up and, rebuking the captain, made the soldiers stand down.

"I was scared to death," recalled Nyo Ohn Myint.

Later that evening, they held a meeting at the party office, where he recalled that she told party comrades, if she were killed, they should use that opportunity "to win democracy and freedom for the country."

Her exploit spread by word-of-mouth. For the Burmese, long cowed by the military regime, it vaulted her to iconic status.

Years of House Arrest

The more the people seemed to exalt Suu Kyi, the more the military seemed to fear her. The party chairman's son, Thant Zin Oo, drove to Suu Kyi's house the morning of July 20, 1989. Like his father's, it was surrounded by soldiers. He had disturbing news. The soldiers had barred his father from leaving home. They had cut the phone lines.

Suu packed a small bag and arranged for a friend to care for the boys. That afternoon, soldiers barged into the compound. They seized 40 NLD members, trucking them off to the notorious Insein (pronounced "insane") Prison.

At 4 p.m. a military official arrived and read a detention order to Suu Kyi. Kim, then 11, asked his mother if she were being taken away. She explained she was going to be locked up in the compound. They carted off boxes of documents.

Michael, who had been in Scotland for his father's funeral, hurried to Rangoon to find his wife on Day 3 of a hunger strike, demanding that she be taken to prison to be with her colleagues. For 12 days she accepted only water, losing 12 pounds, falling below 100 pounds. She relented when a military officer assured her that the activists would be treated humanely.

Thus began six years of house arrest -- it wouldn't be her last -- during which Michael was allowed only two visits. He became a single father in what Carey calls "bachelor digs" in Oxford. "It was jolly difficult," Carey says. "The warm heart of the Aris household" was
no longer there.

In the beginning, separation from her family depressed her, she has said, but any pain or longing "simply became part of my daily life." She maintained a strict regimen: Up by half past 4. An hour of meditation. An hour and a half of radio, BBC, Voice of America, the Democratic Voice of Burma. She exercised on a NordicTrack treadmill. She read extensively, savoring volumes by Rabindranath Tagore, Nehru, Jane Austen. Cleaning, sewing. In bed by 9.

She made a point of dressing nicely every morning, putting jasmine in her hair. A housemaid relayed her doings to the authorities. "That was very dispiriting for them," recalled a friend. "They were expecting her to be bedraggled and unnerved. She never gave them the opportunity."

In the 1990 elections, the NLD won a landslide victory, capturing 82 percent of the seats. The regime, stunned, argued that absent a new constitution, it could not convene the parliament. Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the next year, while she was still under strict house arrest.

She was freed on July 10, 1995, determined to pick up where she had left off. But she was rarely allowed to travel outside Rangoon. When she did, military intelligence would tail her. If she went to a restaurant, she would hear later that it had been shut down. So she rarely ventured into public.

But the public came to her.

Every Saturday afternoon, at 4 sharp, she would mount a wooden riser behind the iron gate at her house, holding a notepad, her eyes bright. Hundreds of people would flock to the gate. Buses would roll slowly past, with folks hanging out of windows to catch a glimpse. Nodding and smiling, she would speak for exactly one hour, discussing education or democracy.

Every week offered a teachable moment. Once, she proudly told of how a woman, bolstered by her talks, went to cash a check, and when the bank clerk began to deduct a fee for a calendar issued by the military, she protested. "But I did not request a calendar." The clerk insisted. The woman stood her ground. Taken aback, the clerk cashed the check in full.

Suu Kyi cited that tiny moment as a victory in the struggle toward democracy. "The idea," says a British friend who lived in Rangoon, "is that if they could resist in some small way, and not bring down punishment on their families, that they would know in their hearts they'd resisted."

The Penalty of Separation

The price Suu Kyi paid for her choice continued to mount.

She attempted to travel outside Rangoon, and each time was forced back after standoffs with the military. On one occasion in 1998, she spent 11 days in a minibus. She stopped drinking to avoid having to urinate in public, then was manhandled by the military and forced home, bruised and dehydrated.

"Look at me, I'm over 50," she said to a friend at one point. "At this age, I should be leading a quiet life. But then I think of Mandela. The poor man's 80 and he's still working."

The government tried to undermine Suu Kyi with posters suggesting crude sexual behavior or that she was anti-Buddhist. Their accusations followed a theme, observed one journalist: "You're married to a foreigner. You've got Western ideas in your mind. You're not really one of us."

The next January, Michael rang Peter Carey. "I've got two pieces of news, one good, one bad," he said. "I've got cancer. But I'm going to beat it." The prostate cancer was advanced. He kept hoping he would get into Burma to see "my Suu," Carey recalls. The government kept refusing his visas. He had not seen her since 1996.

She knew that if she left to be with him, the regime would never let her return. Coming to terms with that reality took prayer and the deep faith of a lifelong Buddhist. It was an intensely difficult time. It seems her choice had always been made -- "my country first," she told "Dateline NBC" in 2000. But it was not an easy choice.

Still, she refused to cast the price paid as a sacrifice. "If you choose to do something, then you shouldn't say it's a sacrifice, because nobody forced you to do it."

Michael died on March 27, 1999. Toward the end of his life, when he was in the hospital, she would try to speak with him every evening. Because her phone line was cut, she arranged to await his call at the home of a diplomat. Military intelligence soon figured it out.

One evening, Michael and Suu had just said hello when the line went dead. In a rare moment of utter despair, she burst into tears.

A Day of Freedom

Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest again in September 2000, and not released until 19 months later.

She was rallying a crowd of 20,000 in western Burma one day last December, when suddenly authorities turned a fire hose on the crowd. In the panic, Suu Kyi climbed on the firetruck and exhorted the people to stay. She lashed out at the security forces, telling them their job was not to bully the people but to serve them. The people stayed.

A friend urged her to tell that story earlier this year when Al Neuharth, president of the Freedom Forum, traveled to Burma to give her an award for her nonviolent struggle for democracy.

"No, I don't want to complain," she said.

"You have to complain," the friend replied.

"It's not about me," she protested.

The friend left thinking, "But it's so about you."

Last December, Suu Kyi was feeling optimistic. She was buoyed particularly by a trip to Shan State, home of a large ethnic minority, because there, the NLD, quite on its own, had been active, helping mothers get milk for their babies, villagers fill out government forms. "There was this sense that the party was a party for the whole country," recalled the British friend.

Then came the May 30 ambush. More than 100 companions, including her 76-year-old deputy, are still detained from that one night.

Today, democracy seems no nearer in Southeast Asia's hermit country.

Though it has been 14 years since he last saw her, Nyo Ohn Myint can still remember the day, because it was so rare, when the entourage took a break from campaigning. They went to Maungmagun Beach in southern Burma.

The young people went swimming, frolicking like children, hurling people into the water. Suu Kyi just walked on the beach, lifting the hem of her sarong as she trod on the sand.

Aunty, come join us! The boys shouted.

She demurred. But she let the spray soak her. She was laughing. She looked so free.

All we want is our freedom
BY Aung San Suu Kyi, Parade Magazine (U.S. national syndicate) - March 9 2003

Traveling across Burma, I ask people why they want democracy. Very often the answer is, "We just want to be free." They do not have to elaborate. I understand what they mean. They want to be able to live their lives without the oppressive sense that their destiny is not theirs to shape. They do not want their daily existence to be ruled by the orders and whims of those whose authority is based on might of arms.

When I ask young people what they mean by freedom, they say that they want to be able to speak their minds. They want to be able to voice their discontent with an education system that does not challenge their intellect. They want to be able to discuss, criticize, argue; to be able to gather in the thousands or even hundreds of thousands to sing, to shout, to cheer. Burma's young people want to play out the vitality of their youth in its full spectrum of hope and wonder--its uncertainties, its arrogance, its fancies, its brilliance, it rebelliousness, its harshness, its tenderness.

What do the women of Burma want? They tell me that they want to be free from the tyranny of rising prices that make a household an exhausting business. They want to be free from anxiety that their husbands might be penalized for independent thinking--or that their children might not be given a chance in life. Many -- too many -- long to be free from having to sell their bodies to support their families.

The farmers and peasants I meet want to sow and plant as they wish, to be able to market their products at will, unhampered by the coercion to sell it to the state at cruelly low prices. They struggle daily with the land. They do not want unreasonable decrees and incomprehensible authority to add to their burden.

And what about those of us in the National League of Democracy? Why are we working so hard to free our country? Is it not that we see democracy through a haze of optimism. We know that democracy is a jewel that must be polished constantly to maintain its luster. To prevent it from being damaged or stolen, democracy must be guarded and unremitting vigilance.

We are working so hard for freedom because only in a free Burma will we be able to build a nation that respects and cherishes human dignity.

As I travel through my country, people often ask me how it feels to have been imprisoned in my home --first for six years, then for 19 months. How could I stand the separation from family and friends? It is ironic, I say, that in an authoritarian state it is only the prisoner of conscience who is genuinely free. Yes, we have given up our right to a normal life. But we have stayed true to that most precious part of our humanity--our conscience.

Here is what I want most for my people: I want the security of genuine freedom and the freedom of genuine security. I would like to see the crippling fetters of fear removed, that the people of Burma may be able to hold their heads high as free human beings. I would like to see them striving in unity and joy to build a safer, happier society for us all. I would especially like to see our younger people stride confidently into the future, their richness of spirit soaring to meet all challenges. I would like to be able to say: "This is a nation worthy of all those who loved it and lived and died for it--that we might be proud of our heritage." These are not dreams. These constitute the reality towards which we have been working for years, firm in our faith that the will of the people will ultimately triumph.

"WE HAVE COMPROMISED"

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi agrees in an interview in Rangoon with senior AsiaWeek correspondent, Roger Mitton on June 5, 1999 that negotiations with Burma's Dictator-Generals could start at a lower level without her.

People have been waiting for years for Myanmar's junta to open substantive negotiations with opposition National League for Democracy. The generals promised they would talk with anybody in the NLD, except the party's leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. The party insisted on her presence. Negotiations never began. Now, though, for the first time Suu Kyi seems willing to let other NLD officials start a dialogue with the generals. The following is the record of this interview published by AsiaWeek OnLine. (Copywrite - Asia Week)

RM: "Yesterday was the 9th anniversay of the 1990 elections which your party won handsomely. What is state of your party today compared to back then?"

ASSK: "Well, I wasn't around when the elections took place because I was under house arrest. So I can't really compare the party today to what it was in 1990. But I can compare it to what it was like before I was placed under house arrest, that is 1989. Compared to 1989, the party is subjected to a lot more restrictions. There have been a lot of arrests of party members in the meantime, and some of our best people are still in prison. Some have started coming out - not because of an amnesty or anything like that, but because they've served their term and are having to juggle their way back into the free, or as free as it is in Burma, free society. And the party, I think, is tougher. It's much more, it's smaller because obviously a lot of our members have been forced to resign. Or they have been put into prison. But I think there's a tougher feel to it, it's more tight knit. It has to be."

RM: "You said in your human rights message in April this year that you have faced more hardship over the past year than over the preceding 7 or 8 yrs."

ASSK: "Oh, yes. Because the authorities, over the last year, really started getting serious about trying to annhilate the party. Because this has been their slogan for I think about two or three years now."

RM: "Annhilation." Annhiliation? This is the term they use?"

ASSK: "Yes, that is the term they actually use. They use this word annhilate. And I think then they changed it to crush perhaps because there was a little bit of criticism on the part of the international community."

RM: "You said the regime's activities against you are tantamount to criminal activities?"

ASSK: "They are criminal activities. Because what they are doing is against the law. According to the terms of the law, some of the things they have done are crimes. So they are criminal activities."

RM: "But there is nothing much you can do about it even so?"

ASSK: "Oh, there is no rule of law in this country. So the fact that they act in these criminal ways, it does not make any difference to them. It makes a lot of difference to the people, of course."

RM: "On May 27 last year your party held a Congress and announced its intention to convene a parliament. That was a fairly dramatic action."

ASSK: "No, it wasn't like that. We did not announce our intention to convene parliament last year. It was not like that. But one of the decisions taken at the Congress was that we should ask the authorities to convene parliament by a certain date."

RM: "And subsequently you placed a deadline of August 21 by which time parliament must be convened by the regime."

ASSK: "That was the decision of the Congress that we should inform the authorities that parliament should be convened by a certain date."

RM: "And if they did not convene parliament by that date?"

ASSK: "Well, we discussed this matter. Party representatives who came to the Congress wanted to know whether we had an alternative plan. And we said we didn't at the moment because the decision had just been made that we should inform the authorities of our decision to ask parliament to be convened. But then we decided that we would have to make an alternative plan because if they didn't meet the deadline then we must take another action."

RM: "That's when you decided you would name your own committee that would represent parliament in the absence of the regime convening it?"

ASSK: "The committee representing parliament, yes. But we went step by step. They didn't convene parliament by the 21st of August, so our party announced that we would then convene parliament on our own and then the regime started arresting our MPs. So then we decided that we would form the committee representing parliament."

RM: "So it was a fairly dramatic summer last year."

ASSK: "But step by step. I think if you put all these things together then it makes it into a great big drama. But that is not how it actually was. It was one thing at a time."

RM: "It certainly captured the attention of the international media, especially when you add on your own attempts to drive out of town."

ASSK: "Yes, but again that was at a different time. It was all spread out from May until September last year. May, June, July, August, September. It was spread out over five months. If you put together what happened over the five months then it seems very dramatic, but if you take it one thing at a time, then you can see that we went quite slowly."

RM: "Yesterday, the one-year anniversary of your congress when you took the first of those steps and asked the regime to convene parliament, you held another party meeting but you did not make any comparable move or first step of any kind?"

ASSK: "Well, there's no need for a first step any more, we've already taken the first and second steps - the second step was to form the committee representing parliament. Now the next stage is to take forward the activities of the committee. That is the logical next step. You can't keep taking first steps all the time. That wouldn't make sense, would it."

RM: "But many people felt you would make another dramatic move on May 27 this year in order to boost your party's profile."

ASSK: "People always want drama, I think especially journalists. They want something dramatic all the time to write about. Which is why I disagree with your view of our having done something terribly dramatic last May. It wasn't like that at all. You're putting together five months events into one day, and then of course, that makes it seem very dramatic."

RM: "So there will be no comparable actions over this summer, even if spread out?"

ASSK: "I don't know what you mean by comparable actions. Because what we did last summer was to go forward step by step, and we will keep on going forward step by step."

RM: "Well, comparable actions like driving out of the city?"

ASSK: "Driving out of the city was not part of the call for convening parliament. It was connected to that because they started arresting our MPs."

RM: "That action of driving out of the city put you and your party into the headlines of the world's media."

ASSK: "Although it may surprise people, we don't do things in order to attract attention. We do what we think would help us in our political aims, that's all."

RM: "So things like driving out of the city, which might precipitate a rather strong reaction from the regime, you are not at the moment planning any of those types of actions this year?"

ASSK: "Last year, if you think back, the first two times we did that, driving out, it was resolved very quietly. And we were not doing it in order to precipitate a strong reaction either. Because the authorities decided to play it in a civilized way and there was a civilized solution. It was only the third time, when it was decided that they wanted to go in for drama. So it was not we who went in for drama. We, as I said earlier, don't do things in order to attract attention or to create drama. We do what we think would be politically beneficial for our party and its supporters."

RM: "I repeat that people were expecting you and your party have to do something dramatic like last year"

ASSK: "We never say what we are going to do in advance. So it's no use in trying to find out."

RM: "But there has been a sense of disappointment or a deflation among people that nothing happened yesterday on the May 27 anniversary."

ASSK: "It depends on how political they are. If they study the announcements of the committee representing parliament, they would know that we have taken actually a much bigger step than we have done since last September. Because we are starting to make plans for preparing a Constitution, and for getting closer to the nationalities. But people are not interested in the real politics of it, they just want dramatic events."

RM: "Do you believe that the people are still behind you?"

ASSK: "Oh, yes, much more now than ever. Because I think we have much more support now than we had say three years ago, when there were those who thought that perhaps the government's economic policies were getting them somewhere and that the country might be improving economically. But last year - well, in 1997, that was really the crunch year for the economy - it became obvious towards the end of 1997 that things were not going well. And last year it became even more evident. And because of that, we have more support now than we had, say, three years ago. I think the best years for the regime were between 1993 and 1996 from the point of view of the economy. Because at that time, people really believed that there was going to be a big boom."

RM: "You extrapolate dissatisfaction with the economy into support for you?"

ASSK: "No, I don't think so. I think people support us because they are discontent with the present regime. That's normal in any circumstances. You know, people support the opposition because they don't like the incumbent. So whether it's for economic reasons, political reasons or social reasons, it's not always the same. But I would say that primarily in Burma at the moment it's for economic as well as political reasons. But I think that it's the economic reasons which have swung so much support in our favor over the last couple of years."

RM: "How can we gauge your support from the people, aside from getting feedback from your members?"

ASSK: "You can also look at how cooperative the general public is with the authorities. I think then you will have some idea of how much they like or dislike this regime. I mean you can grade the degree of support or lack of support for the regime that way. And anybody who has studied the situation here would find that the general public are not really cooperative with the regime at all. They are reluctantly dragging their feet, going along with what they are made to do. But you don't find any enthusiasm for the policies of this regime. You can also look at how cooperative the general public is with the authorities. I think then you will have some idea of how much they like or dislike this regime. I mean you can grade the degree of support or lack of support for the regime that way. And anybody who has studied the situation here would find that the general public are not really cooperative with the regime at all. They are reluctantly dragging their feet, going along with what they are made to do. But you don't find any enthusiasm for the policies of this regime."

RM: "Former ASEAN secretary-general Ajit Singh, when he was sitting with the regime's Gen. David Abel last night, asked me why Asiaweek did not write more about you and your party losing support."

ASSK: "Why is he saying that? Because he obviously wants you to write about it. In fact, Asiaweek and other Asian magazines have put forward this point of view. So I suppose they want to emphasize this point of view, which is not really surprising coming from an ASEAN country."

RM: "If an election were held again tomorrow, would you win in comparable style as in 1990?"

ASSK: "Oh, absolutely. Perhaps even better."

RM: "There are those who say that was then and this is now."

ASSK: "Well, I'll say one thing, it's only if elections are free and fair. I doubt that if there were an election tomorrow, it would be free and fair because I think the regime has learned a very hard lesson from the previous elections. And I think if they were to hold elections tomorrow, they would make sure that the elections were rigged so that whoever they want to win will win. I don't think they would allow it to be free and fair elections. Because they miscalculated very badly in 1990."

RM: "There are those who say that the election would not be won by the NLD, it would be won by you. And it would be won by you because of your name - the name of your father, Aung San, who is a hero to the people."

ASSK: "They said this about the last elections too. A lot of people say the last elections were won because of me rather than because of the NLD. But that's a matter of opinion."

RM: "They say the party is nothing without you."

ASSK: "I don't think that is true. I would be nothing without the party. After all, I can't work without a party. And obviously it helps the party to have me because my father's name still means a lot in Burma."

RM: "The rather scabrous cartoons that appear every day in the New Light of Myanmar do not bother you?"

ASSK: "No, we've got so used to that. That's been going on for a year or two now. Certainly a long time. We've got quite used to that. We'd be quite surprised if they didn't come out. In fact, they are one of our biggest assets, as it were. Because the nasty cartoons have turned a lot of people against this regime. We get feedback from ordinary Burmese people, from a lot of Burmese business people who are not particularly political and who I don't think were really hardline supporters of the democracy movement or anything like that. They are people who really had not that much against the military regime either as long as they could make the economy work it was all right. But when these cartoons and very very vicious articles started coming out in the government media, the feedback we got was that some of these people just felt embarrassed. And they began to think that it showed up exactly how the regime has no standards at all. The nastiness of the cartoons reflects the nastiness of the regime - and also their low intellectual approach if you like."

RM: "At the ASEAN conference being held here yesterday and today, Gen. Khin Nyunt gave the keynote speech. He said: "Myanmar is on the right political track that will guarantee the peace, stability and prosperity of the nation." Is the country on the right track to prosperity?"

ASSK: "Well, it's certainly not prospering. I don't agree with that statement at all. Let's put it like that."

RM: "You have said in the past that things are worse now than they were under the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) - the regime led by Gen. Ne Win from 1962 to 1988?"

ASSK: "Yes, I think a lot of people would agree with that. It's much better now for a few people. The economic opportunities that have come into the hands of a few people have made them very very wealthy; but in general I think Burma is much worse off. Take the lack of electricity. It was not this bad under the BSPP. Now there is a very very bad shortage of electricity. I think in some cases a shortage of water as well. Because in many places even in the middle of the city, people depend on electicity to crank up water from the ground floor to the upper floors. So no electricity means no water. And if the electricity only comes on at 12 o'clock at night they have to get up at 12 o'clock in order to get water in while they can.And look at the state of the schools and hospitals. They are much worse now than they were under the BSPP. Because under the BSPP, I don't think that there were complaints that there were no medicines in the hospitals. Or no equipment. There was a certain lack of sophisticated equipment and perhaps they did not have all the medicines necessary. But the situation was much better. But now they have nothing in the hospitals. And the same thing for the schools. The schools under the BSPP were not all that hot, but now they don't have basic things like textbooks. Although in some schools they have built up these fancy computer showrooms with computers which are kept under lock and key, except for demonstration purposes. So I think one can say that we are much worse off. And of course, if you look at the statistics collected by an agency like UNICEF, which is nothing to do with either the democracy side or the military regime, you would find that the percentage of people who don't go to school at all isrising. And the percentage of elementary school dropouts is also rising."

RM: "Yet people who came here during the 1980s say that the roads then were all potholled, that there was only one decent hotel in Yangon where you got a candle when you checked in and so on; whereas now the roads are okay, there are lots of cars and the place is full of hotels."

ASSK: "As I said, for some people it has got better. I said for the privileged people it has got better. But how many Burmese people use these hotels anyway? How many Burmese people are going to fly in after a holiday abroad? So for those who can do it, yes, it's better."

RM: "Someone mentioned to me that, of course, even the military men suffer from power outtages and other hardships from the economic situation, so it's not as if they are benefitting from this."

ASSK: "It depends on where you are. You can be a quite low-ranking officer, but if you happen to be in the right place i.e. a place where you can make a lot of money, where people like to bribe you, or where you are in a position to dictate how people live, then you can get very very wealthy. But a higher ranking officer who is in a position where there are no bribes coming in, then he will not be well off. And of course the rank and file are not well off."

RM: "They may not be well off, but everyone seems to agree that there are no signs of unrest by younger officers, no signs of dissatisfaction."

ASSK: "Well, there are always rumors about dissatisfaction because the soldiers are poor. The rank and file are poor. They don't get enough to eat. And I think you will find that a number of families of soldiers are putting up little stalls, little snackbars, in the areas where they have barracks because the husbands are not earning enough. That you can see everywhere all over the place."

RM: "Businessmen tell me that the kyat economy is doing quite well, growing by 3% to 4% annually; that it is only the dollar economy that is doing badly."

ASSK: "What do they mean by the kyat economy doing well?"

RM: "Using kyat for purchases, trade and whatever, it's only things that you need to import, or the national projects where foreign currency is used and where there's a lack of foreign exchange, that are really hurting".

ASSK: "Yes, but what do they mean by the economy doing well? Of course, we buy things with the kyat, if that's what you mean. That we go on doing. But with the rate of inflation, business has dampened down. Ordinary foodstalls or restaurants, eating places, where you pay in kyats, I think there are fewer customers there too."

RM: "Even in rural areas?"

ASSK: "Even in the rural areas people are having to tighten their belts. But in the rural areas, of course, there are not that many economic enterprises growing as there are in the urban areas. In the rural areas there are mainly farmers and the agricultural economy is not doing all that well. For example, recently because the rain started so early this year, in April, I was told that the peanut crop has been really bad. So that's going too affect peanut farmers hard. And that also means that the price of peanut oil is going to go up."

RM: "Yet few seem to think that the weak economy will lead to political change. They think the people will just struggle on as they have done for the past forty years or so."

ASSK: "It always surprises me when people make remarks like that. Considering the fact that in 1988 what happened happened really because of the economy."

RM: "Well, it was the demonetarization of some of the kyat notes that really caused that to happen, wasn't it?"

ASSK: "Yes, but that hurt them economically. The fact that some of the kyat notes were demonetized didn't really bring about a revolution at all. It was nearly a year before the 1988 demonstrations broke out, but in the meantime of course the people had been getting poorer and poorer. And the economic hardships were getting worse and worse. And so it was a culmination of many economic hardships. I think economic reasons have always played a fairly big part in political revolution."

RM: "Is that what you are seeking: a political revolution?"

ASSK: "We are seeking a political revolution simply through political means. By doing politics which is what we are doing, and which is what the government is trying to prevent us from doing. So if a revolution breaks out, it will not be of our doing. It will be because the government has more or less blocked all other paths to political change."

RM: "Would you support the people if unrest like that breaks out?"

ASSK: "If you mean that would I support violence, no I would not support violence. Because I don't think that violence really does anybody any good. But if you mean that would we support a spontaneous demonstration by the people for better conditions, certainly we would. Why shouldn't we? We know there is a need for better conditions."

RM: "If an NLD government came in, would it broadly follow a market economy?"

ASSK: "Yes, we have actually brought out a couple of papers of our economic policy, but people never read them. Then they ask what is our economic policy. They say: don't you have an economic program? When in fact we have brought out a number of papers on this and most foreign correspondents don't read them. And then they ask us what our economic program is."

RM: "You continue to believe that economic sanctions against your country are a good thing?"

ASSK: "I think sanctions are effective. The government says two things. Sometimes they say that sanctions have no effect whatsoever so they don't care about them - in which case, why are they making a fuss. And then sometimes they say that sanctions are hurting the ordinary people in Burma. But when they say that the sanctions are hurting the ordinary people of Burma, then that does not sound good either because that's tantamount to saying that they are different from the ordinary people and that their life is quite different. So either way you look at it, the regime's approach toward sanctions is inconsistent and not very uplifting. But we think that sanctions have been effective, because as the United States is such a strong economic power, then when sanctions came in, potential investors started looking into the situation very carefully. And then they found that there were many things that they didn't like about the business practices and the invesment laws of Burma. And that is why they backed off. Not simply because the U.S. brought in sanctions."

RM: "There are those who say that sanctions are a bankrupt policy, that they've never really worked and that all they are doing is bringing hardship to the people of your country?"

ASSK: "Well, they are not causing hardship to the people of the country. That we can say. So to people like that, I would just say that: prove it, prove that sanctions are hurting the people of the country. And they can't really prove it. The US sanctions are not such that they in any way effect the Burmese economy as it is to a great extent. The ones who are hurt are the ones who are right at the top, who were thinking of having dealings with American firms. Because the sanctions didn't get rid of all investments; it was just that no new investments could come in. So, whom does that hurt? Only those who were planning to work with American companies. And how would that help the ordinary people? I just don't know how they argue that it hurts the ordinary people."

RM: "But they might argue that if there were no sanctions then there might be investment in infrastructure projects that might alleviate the power shortage and other things that make life so difficult for ordinary people."

ASSK: "But what is the proof that any American firm was thinking of doing that kind of infrastructure work anyway? There is no proof of any kind. There were some individuals who had plans to go into business with American firms, but not on things like that. It was for their own personal profit. And I suppose sanctions have hurt people like that. But not the ordinary people of Burma."

RM: "You disagree with those in ASEAN who continue to invest in your country?"

ASSK: "I think a lot of people are losing. A lot of the ASEAN investments here are not doing well at all. If you look at the hotels you would get a good idea of how badly they are. How big a percentage of their rooms are full?"

RM: "I think you said once that the ASEAN economic crisis was helping your cause, is that a correct interpretation?"

ASSK: "I don't know whether I said it was helping us as such, but I think I may have said the ASEAN economic crisis made the problems of Burma much more evident to others. Because they were not able to help Burma, they were so busy with their own problems. And then the economic incompetence of this regime became more obvious, with nobody to bale them out."

RM: "In that earlier statement of Khin Nyunt's at the ASEAN meeting here, he also spoke of the government bringing peace and stability. People say that a major achievement of the regime has been to settle the ethnic insurgencies. Do you agree?"

ASSK: "They have had the ceasefire agreements, but they are still ceasefire agreements. They don't seem to have come to any longterm political solution. Because the ceasefire groups are still holding onto their arms. And that in itself creates an element of instability, because members of the ceasefire groups can just go into the big cities of Burma with revolvers at their hips. And it is illegal for ordinary Burmese citizens to go around with a lethal weapon. But members of the ceasefire groups, I suppose the officials, can be seen around with their guns."

RM: "So would you say that the regime has achieved a halfway step in bringing stability and curbing the ethnic fighting?"

ASSK: "They've got the halfway step, yes. But I don't know about stability. If they are so confident of the stability of this country, why haven't they reopened the universities?"

RM: "They may regard that as a different issue from dealing with the border insurgencies."

ASSK: "Well, it's all to do with stability, isn't it. You can't say it's a different issue."

RM: "There are worries, especially in the regime, but also outside, that if you come to power the country will be plunged into a Yugoslavia or Indonesia type situation, with ethnic fighting flaring up all over the place."

ASSK: "I don't buy that at all. It's such a silly idea that I don't really even think it's worth discussing in great detail. But if you must go into the Yugoslavia problem, the animosities, the hostilities, between the various racial groups in Yugoslavia go back to the 12th century."

RM: "Do they not go back just as far here between the different ethnic groups? - the Shan, Wa, Mon, Arakans and so on?"

ASSK: "Not quite in the same way. The Wa is a new element. We've had wars between the Mons and the Burmese, and between the Arakanese and the Burmese. Not so much with the Shans, although there have been squirmishes with individual Shan chieftans, Shan rulers. But the kind of problems that existed in Yugoslavia, I think were exacerbated by the years of totalitarian rule. When people were not allowed to work out their differences through a pluralistic political system. And the tradition of settling their differences through violence was never really removed. It hasn't been removed in Burma either. Because the regime itself is trying to resolve problems through violence. Putting people in prison is violence. Killing people is violence. They are still using violent means to resolve problems, and violence never really resolved problems. It may keep them under control to a certain extent. So I don't think that their methods are going to bring about permanent peace."

RM: "But people still fear that if there were an NLD-led government tomorrow there would be a holocaust."

ASSK: "Well, if you look back to what Burma was like after independence, I don't think you can say that. The first Karen insurgencies of course started the moment Burma became independent, because some groups did not accept the Burmese government, or rather a government dominated by Burmese. But in those days under parliamentary democracy, yes there were insurgencies which were really a legacy of the war. There were Communist insurgencies, and there were a few ethnic insurgencies, but the number of ethnic insurgencies really increased dramatically under the BSPP. So you cannot really say that it was democracy that led to all these ethnic dissatisfactions."

RM: "You believe it might be the dictatorial nature of the regime, the repression, that caused that?"

ASSK: "Yes, because people were not allowed to express their dissatisfaction through acceptable political channels. The only way they could express their dissatisfaction was by taking up arms."

RM: "There are people in countries that border Myanmar, certainly in Thailand, who worry about what will happen if you come to power, whether they will have fighting all along their border."

ASSK: "I think they should worry about their own country. We'll worry about ours."

RM: "But you acknowledge that the regime has come halfway to bringing some measure of stability?"

ASSK: "I won't say stability. I think stability is a different issue. But I think we will say that they have come halfway to bringing an end to armed ethnic insurgencies."

RM: "I drove to Mawlamyine last weekend and passed over two new bridges. The road is greatly improved, you can drive all the way there without needing to take a ferry any more. Has the regime also done some good in this regard?"

ASSK: "But isn't putting up bridges and building roads the job of any government? If you are going to talk like that then we'll have to start making a list of all the bridges and the roads and the railways lines that were put up by the colonial government. If you are going to say that good government is one which builds bridges and puts down roads and railways, then we'd have to favor the colonial government as a very good government. But I doubt that the regime would accept such a definition. So, all right, they have put up bridges, there is nothing wrong with it, and bridges are a good thing - if they are built strongly and won't fall down under the weight of too many cars; but this is just normal work that any government would be expected to do and I would not think that this is a justification for a military regime to keep clinging to power."

RM: "Members of the regime often say that you may disagree with much of what we do, but there is never any acknowledgement of the good things we do."

ASSK: "Well, wouldn't you have thought that the ASEAN countries acknowledge it more than enough? To make up for whoever it is who do not. A lot of the ASEAN countries talk about the ceasefire agreements, and they also talk about the so-called economic boom - but they've stopped talking about that now, although two or three years ago they were talking about the hotels, the cars and the roads and so on. So what does the regime mean by saying nobody talks about it? People talked about it a lot. But they've stopped talking about it, because you can't go on talking about the hotels when the hotels are empty. And you can't go on talking about the roads when the roads are empty of the expected new traffic. You can't go on talking about them again and again. How often do we expect people to go on talking about bridges and roads and hotels?"

RM: "But they feel that it would be nice if the West, which has led the move to sanctions and pretty relentlessly criticizes them, would occasionally acknowledge that they have done something that benefitted the people. It might be a gesture that might bring a response."

ASSK: "The West would be least inclined to be impressed by hotels and roads and bridges."

RM: "Why? This is more than a lot of developing countries do."

ASSK: "I don't think the West would be impressed by hotels. The tourists might be pleased with them. Bridges, yes. I'm not sure that bridges are really considered that impressive any more."

RM: "The regime feels that this begrudging attitude towards them makes them feel that if they do something positive, if they move towards you in a conciliatory gesture or whatever, that all they will get is to be ignored or rebuffed."

ASSK: "But what sort of gesture have they ever made?"

RM: "They spoke to some of your people two or three years ago, they allowed you to have your Congress last year, but each time they do this the ante is raised and they are expected to do something else."

ASSK: "Oh, no, when we were allowed to have the Congress, we were very very loud with our words of appreciation. Yes, we said we appreciated the fact that we were able to hold the Congress. So it's not true. Every time they made a gesture we acknowledged it - but to the degree of the importance of the gesture. Not more than that. But it didn't mean that after acknowledging the gesture then we sat back and did nothing. Because we went ahead with our work. But we certainly said that we appreciated it very much. I said it myself so I should know."

RM: "The ASEAN policy of constructive engagement is one which you feel is not really succeeding?"

ASSK: "It hasn't succeeded. What has it done? When ASEAN was considering Burma as a permanent member a couple of years ago, we made two points. One was that admitting Burma as a member would make the regime more repressive, because they would think that their policies have been endorsed. They would see it as a seal of approval. Or, at least, if it was not a seal of approval it was a sign that the ASEAN countries didn't mind about the human rights record of the military regime. And the second thing we said was that Burma under this military regime was not going to be an asset to the organization. And I think we can claim that both these views have been vindicated."

RM: "They are more repressive since joining ASEAN?"

ASSK: "Oh, they have got much much more repressive since they became a full member of ASEAN. And I don't think that really Burma is much of a credit to ASEAN these days. It's not exactly a shining example for them."

RM: "The US espouses constructive engagement on China but not on Myanmar. This inconsistency puzzles many people, even Western diplomats. How do you explain it?"

ASSK: "I think the situation in China is different. And surprising as it may sound to some people, we think that Chinese dissidents have a much better deal than we have. In China, even when I was under house arrest, I would listen to the radio and I would be surprised by the fact that families of dissidents could talk to foreign correspondents and express their concern about their husbands and fathers and they would not be arrested. They would have these interviews quite freely. And I think the Chinese are quite sensible about give and take as regards dissidents. And with give and take with the Western democracies. The military regime here is far more intransigent and that's why I think one can say that constructive engagement with China bears more results than constructive engagement with Burma. I don't see any sort of give and take with regards to human rights taking place here - either between Burma and the Western democracies, or between Burma and the ASEAN countries."

RM: "Has there been any give on the other side?"

ASSK: "Yes. But no give on the side of the regime. This is what we say ad nauseum as well, that the regime does not want give and take, but they take all and we give all. But that's not what you mean by give and take. It's meant to be a bit of both on both sides."

RM: "Talking about how they treat you, Dr Mathahir once said it's not as if you are being strung up."

ASSK: "Well, that's right. Again that's his personal opinion. And it's not one with which we agree."

RM: "If you came to power you would not feel uncomfortable with such ASEAN leaders?"

ASSK: "No, you don't. Politics is not like that."

RM: "You feel the US is giving you adequate support?"

ASSK: "Yes, I think they support us very very staunchly. And so do other democracies, particularly the Scandinavian countries. And the EU."

RM: "The regime worries that if you come to power you might seek retribution of some sort."

ASSK: "We have always said that we are not interested in vengeance. That's our official policy."

RM: "Your principle goal is the welfare of the people, not yourself or your party?"

ASSK: "Well, the welfare of the people, yes. I mean, what I need for my own welfare I'd be better off not doing politics. If I were just concerned for my own welfare."

RM: "If your principle interest is the people of your country, why don't you step aside and let someone else deal with representatives of the government in a dialogue - given that the regime says it will talk to anyone in your party but you."

ASSK: "But that's just an excuse. They have made a lot of misleading statements about dialogue. And they have shown a lack of sincerity with regard to dialogue."

RM: "You feel that even if you agreed to this they would not engage in substantive dialogue?"

ASSK: "No, no. They are not engaging in dialogue because they don't want to, because they don't want to give up power. It's not because there's any real reason for not engaging in dialogue."

RM: "Why not give it another try and say you will send someone else?"

ASSK: "We have said that we would agree to lower level negotiations which would not involve me."

RM: "You have?"

ASSK: "Yes. Actually, we agreed to that in 1997 when it was put to us through a third party. And when we agreed, they didn't come back on it, so we knew that they were not sincere. It's just an excuse. They are always coming up with new excuses."

RM: "But your party has put out statements saying that the regime should not demand that you not be present, that they choose their representatives to dialogue and you choose yours."

ASSK: "Right, that's true. Of course, we've always said that what we want is genuine political dialogue not a dictated set showpiece."

RM: "But your choice is that you should represent your party?"

ASSK: "We have not said who we are going to choose. But we said we'll choose our own representatives. They can't dictate to us. Then will they let us dictate to them whom they choose as their representatives? How would you call it genuine political dialogue if each side does not have the right to determine its own representatives. If one side is going to dictate terms under which the other side participates in the negotiations that's not really negotiations at all."

RM: "What is wrong with taking that step?"

ASSK: "What step? That we allow them to decide on the representatives from our side?"

RM: "Yes, if it's for the good of the people, if it might resolve the impasse."

ASSK: "Well, how would you call this in terms of equality?"

RM: "It's not equal, but does it matter if it gets the process moving?"

ASSK: "But then that's not genuine political dialogue. And would you not say that what we need is genuine political dialogue?"

RM: "Of course, but they may be genuine - it's just that they don't like dealing with you."

ASSK: "Well, if they didn't like dealing with me, why didn't they have a dialogue with our party chairman U Aung Shwe when I was under house arrest for six years and he asked for it so many times over and over again. It was after I was released from house arrest they brought out this excuse that they didn't want to talk to me, that's why they were not having negotiations. But when I was under house arrest, U Aung Shwe actually asked to talk to them and at one point he was not even asking them for broad political negotiations, he was simply asking to discuss with them the working procedures of the National Convention - because it was so undemocratic. And they refused to talk to him. So if what they wanted was dialogue without me, they had six years in which to do it."

RM: "Okay but that's the past, now you say you would be agreeable to a dialogue process starting that did not include you but rather other members of your party?"

ASSK: "They didn't talk about dialogue without me at all then, it was only after I was released that they said that the reason why they couldn't have dialogue with the NLD was because they didn't want to talk to me. So it's an obvious excuse."

RM: "But whatever happened in the past, let me get it right: you are agreeable to lower level talks that do not include you?"

ASSK: "We have said we were agreeable. We have said that in 1997. And then they pretended that they had heard nothing about it."

RM: "That means their only other objection to talks is this committee that you set up representing parliament. They want you to rescind this parliamentary committee."

ASSK: "We are not going to rescind it, because that's blackmail. They've taken our people into detention, and then they say that if you dissolve this committee then we'll release them. That's blackmail. And we are not going to fall for it. And if you read our paper you will know exactly why we don't believe that they will really move towards dialogue simply because we give into some of their demands. They are always coming up with some new excuse or the other."

RM: "So you are not agreeable to rescinding the parliamentary committee?"

ASSK: "No. Not until parliament has been convened. We said that if you want to rescind the committee, it's very easy: convene parliament. Because we have made it quite clear that this committee stays only until parliament is convened."

RM: "Politics is the art of the possible. You seem to be holding out for the impossible."

ASSK: "Why? What are we holding out for that is impossible?"

RM: "Parliament for a start. They are not going to give it to you."

ASSK: "Well, that's what they say. In how many countries have military regimes absolutely insisted that they were not going to give in and they had to give in anyway. So what's so impossible about asking for change?"

RM: "In practical terms there are very few people who feel that you are going to get this."

ASSK: "Well, why?"

RM: "You know them yourself, you know they are not going to do this."

ASSK: "Well, haven't there been regimes just as bad, just as obdurate, and actually far more efficient, but in the end they had to agree to change. And this is what surprises me when people say: how can you expect change? As if the world has not been changing and is not changing all the time. It is all the time and people keep on being surprised because we expect change."

RM: "The regime is not going to give in on this and you won't rescind the committee. Everybody is in an entrenched position: you, the regime and Western governments. Nobody is willing to move out of their positions. And the ones who lose out and suffer are the people of Myanmar."

ASSK: "Now that's not fair. You've just said to me: would we agree to lower level dialogue? And I said: yes, we agree to that. So that shows that we were not entrenched. But they were entrenched. I mean, there have been other cases like that when we have said, yes, we are prepared to be flexible. And they have not been prepared to be flexible. So you cannot say that we have been in an entrenched position."

RM: "That is the feeling though, that you are all entrenched."

ASSK: "It may be a feeling, but that is because people have not studied the situation carefully enough."

RM: "Some even start to think that you are all content with the status quo, the impasse."

ASSK: "No, nobody is happy with the status quo. If people were happy with the status quo they would not try to change it. It's because we are not happy with the status quo that we are trying to change it."

RM: "There is certainly a degree of cynicism building up, that nothing is moving."

ASSK: "Well, I don't know where that cynicism is building up. But it's certainly not with us."

RM: "It is just very sad for an outsider coming in, asking the same questions, getting the same answers from all sides."

ASSK: "Yes, for a journalist it's boring, the same answers. It's not a new story. But it doesn't mean that because you get the same answers, that that's the end of the world. In some countries I think you get the same answers for decades."

RM: "In an interview early last year you were reported as saying: The NLD is prepared to consider all options including power sharing with the ruling military junta."

ASSK: "I think they misquoted me. We just said that we didn't rule out anything. We are prepared to discuss anything on the negotiation table."

RM: "So you don't rule out power sharing?"

ASSK: "No. We say we don't rule out anything before negotiations. After all, that's what negotiations are for. To find out what one can accept."

RM: "You are regarded as inflexible by the regime, and increasingly by people within Myanmar. Even NLD-friendly diplomats feel you have been too inflexible."

ASSK: "Inflexible in what way?"

RM: "Not willing to compromise and be more conciliatory."

ASSK: "Well, we have compromised. Now we can keep coming back to this business of dialogue. We have compromised a great deal, and suggested all the different ways in which we could start dialogues so that they don't need to lose face and they can just start it going. But they wouldn't accept any of these compromises."

RM: "Obviously you feel that this is an unfair characterisation."

ASSK: "I don't think of it as fair or unfair. I think it is inevitable in such situations. Because if you stand up to a military regime and stick to our guns, you are accused of being inflexible. You have to try to make a distinction between standing up for certain basic principles, and between inflexibility. If you are to be considered flexible only if you give up all the basic democratic principles which we are fighting for, then why would we be doing with this movement at all?"

RM: "The military regime is implacably opposed to having you as the leader of the country."

ASSK: "It's not their business. It's really not their business. I mean, neither the NLD nor I have ever said that our aim is to make me the leader of this country. And in any case, that is a question for the people of Burma to decide, not for the military."

RM: "I think most people assume that if the NLD takes over, you would be the leader, and to be fair I think this is the assumption of most of the world."

ASSK: "Well, they can make their own assumptions. They are free to do so. We believe in the freedom of belief and thought."

RM: "You are saying that if an NLD government comes about you will not necessarily be its leader?"

ASSK: "No, not necessarily. I mean, where is there a rule of law that I must become the leader of this country when the NLD comes to power? I mean, there isn't any."

RM: "To be realistic you are equated with the party, you are the figurehead of the party. This is reality."

ASSK "Yes. This is reality. But that doesn't mean that just because I am equated with the party I will necessarily become the leader of Burma when the NLD comes to power. I may or I may not. There are many imponderables in politics."

RM: "People say you are a crusader not a politician."

ASSK: "A crusader? Well, that's a very romantic way of looking at it. If you consider the things that we have to do every day at the NLD office, I think they would realize that we are very much down to earth politicians. We just have no time to be crusaders."

RM: "At the present time, your own party is becoming riven with defections and members are splitting away of their own volition."

ASSK: "I don't think the expression riven with defections is quite right. We have had a few people leave - but they are working with the authorities and we can declare this with a clear conscience and very definitely. Apart from anything else this has been proven by the fact that an article came out in the government media supporting them. And that only happens to people who are working with the authorities. That's not very new either. And not very surprising either. Because not everybody has the staying power under the circumstances."

RM: "You think that is being fair to these people who have split? I'm sure that if someone sincerely decided that for whatever reason they wanted to break with you and they did, then the government press would still write about them."

ASSK: "Well, they didn't break with us. What they did, what they were saying is that they were just trying to put suggestions to us as loyal members of the party. Now if you want to put suggestions to the NLD as loyal members, you don't send one copy of your statement to General Khin Nyunt as well. Their suggestions were addressed to U Aung Shwe and to Khin Nyunt. Now this is not the action of loyal party members wanting to, you know, make a suggestion."

RM: "They say as loyal citizens of the country they were addressing both sides of the impasse to try to seek a resolution."

ASSK: "That is not what they said. They said they were loyal members of the party. They were simply putting up suggestions. That was what was said in their letter."

RM: "Is that true?"

ASSK: "Yes. In the letter written by a couple of them."

RM: "I have the letter here, as you say it is addressed to the NLD chairman U Aung Shwe and to Gen. Khin Nyunt."

ASSK: "Exactly, now if you are acting as a loyal member of the party, what is the need to write to Secretary-1 as well?"

RM: "To try to break this impasse however you can. They say they just wrote the letter to try to get the two sides together, to get a dialogue going."

ASSK: "Well, but they were giving suggestions to us. They were not saying to the SPDC that they should be less repressive. They were not suggesting to Khin Nyunt that they should treat the party in a fairer way. So this in itself indicates that this paper, this letter, is not balanced. If they were really thinking of the welfare of the country, then it's got to be a balanced approach. They could say to the NLD: well, you could be more flexible in such matters, and they must also say to the SPDC that you will have to be less repressive, you will have to stop throwing our people into prison, and torturing them and intimidating them."

RM: "I spoke to these three men who were behind the letter, the NLD men - Than Tun, Tin Tun Maung and Kyi Win. You regard them as basically traitors to the party for speaking out in this way?"

ASSK: "We expelled Than Tun from the party two years ago, because he was trying to create factions within the party. And U Tin Tun Maung and U Kyi Win were also close to U Than Tun even then. But since they were not the guiding force at that time, we did not take action against them."

RM: "Tin Tun Maung sounds reasonably persuasive and appeared sincere and not to have had his arm twisted by the regime into doing this."

ASSK: "Well, of course, he would seem to be sincere."

RM: "And they did get the signatures of 25 NLD MP-elects at one point to sign this letter."

ASSK: "Yes, but I think a lot of them have withdrawn their signatures."

RM: "Does this episode not indicate a latent feeling within the party that perhaps you should change your tack?"

ASSK: "No, no. Because what they are suggesting, at least as I understand from that press conference they gave where they were asked what their grand plan was because they said they had a plan to move things forward. And they answered that it was lower level talks. But that is so old hat for us, because as I say this was taken off in 1997 and put to one side. So what's the grand plan? It becomes nothing. Just lower level talks. And the SPDC had already indicated towards the end of 1997 that they were not interested in lower level talks."

RM: "People complain of your imperious manner. That you do not brook any dissent against your views within the party."

ASSK: "Well, when U Than Tun brought out his paper two years ago, we actually had a very very thorough discussion with him. We invited him to discuss it with us - with the whole Executive Committee not just me. And if we brooked no dissent we would have kicked him out straight away. But we didn't. And we discussed the matter very thoroughly. And they were allowed full opportunity to express their views. And they were not able to come up with any justification for what they were doing, and they still went on trying to create factions within the party. So we took action against them under the disciplinary committee of the party. We do have rules in the party."

RM: "Might they form a 'third force' with other disaffected party members?"

ASSK:"No, I'm not worried in the least bit. Somebody asked me whether I was worried that they might form a political party. I said I would be very happy if they formed a political party. Because that would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that they were working with the authorities. Because only then would they be allowed to form a new political party."

RM: "New political parties are not allowed now?"

ASSK: "No, there are no political parties coming into existence at this moment. And what is also very telling is that they were given full facilities to go all over Burma to try to persuade other MPs to join them. And the great majority of our MPs are under virtual house arrest. Certainly they are not allowed out of town."

RM: "Bottomline: is the NLD disintegrating?"

ASSK: "No, no. Only people like that. I don't like to mention names, but some of this present lot were already wavering in 1996 when they were first placed under detention. It was enough to scare them. The first time we tried to hold a congress in May 1996, when all our MPs were taken in, some of those who signed this letter resigned as MPs then. And there were others who almost resigned then, but then they were encouraged to stay on. They were just nervous, they couldn't stand up to the pressure."

RM: "How do you feel about these people in the party who crack under the pressure?"

ASSK: "I don't particularly feel anything against those who crack under pressure, because it is difficult. And I think there are times when people are at a low ebb, their spirits are at a low ebb, and they feel they can't get on anymore. But what I don't like is the way in which they try to justify the fact that they cannot go on anymore in terms of their concern over the welfare of the people etc etc. I think I would respect them much more if they simply said, as some have said, we really can't take it any more. You know, we just want a bit of peace and quiet."

RM: "You lost your former party vice president and key adviser U Kyi Maung some time ago."

ASSK: "Yes, he has effectively retired I should say."

RM: "I saw him yesterday morning, he feels that people like this should be allowed to dissent."

ASSK: "To dissent?"

RM: "To express dissenting views from the party's mainline."

ASSK: "Of course, they can express dissenting views. As I said, they can express dissenting views through the right channels, in the right way. But expressing dissenting views is quite different from writing to Khin Nyunt."

RM: "Some say you lost your key adviser when you lost U Kyi Maung. And that as a result you have never been as clear in your political thinking since then."

ASSK: "No. U Kyi Maung was not my key adviser. He worked in a group together before with U Aung Shwe and VP U Tin U. They and U Kyi Maung were all in the army at one time. So they were one group as it were. And then of course there is the rest of the EC as well."

RM: "Your executive committee is getting pretty long in the tooth."

ASSK: "Well, yes, the younger ones are in jail at the moment. Our younger potential EC members."

RM: "It seems that the regime feels more comfortable than ever at this time. They are less worried about you and your party. Many feel they are winning the PR battle so to speak."

ASSK: "I don't know whether they are less worried or more worried, but we are not particularly worried either. Because I think the regime knows that they have a lot of problems."

RM: "Reading some recent reports in the regional press, I see headlines like 'Burmese icon suffers indignity of dissent' and 'Critics have a tough time with Aung San Suu Kyi' etc etc. It seems even normally supportive papers are being more critical of you."

ASSK: "We've always had that. I don't think we have ever had 100% support from any media. I think there were probably some Western newspapers which consistently supported the movement for democracy. But I don't think you can say that for any of the Asian media."

RM: "You don't feel that you are somehow losing the game?"

ASSK: "No, we've always had ups and downs. This is nothing new. We've always had these declarations about how the NLD is losing ground and it's, you know, people are falling away. And then again you get another wave of you know troubles within the NLD and too much pressure and cracking up, it's really like waves going up and down, and that's politics. It's been like that since the very beginning in 1988. We have never had, I don't think we've ever had a run of more than a few months of consistent, of one view of the NLD. It'll be like this now, like this time. I remember a matter of days before the elections in 1990 a lot of newspapers were commenting on the fact that of course the NLD was popular and that it could possibly win the largest number of seats in parliament, but certainly not a majority. And this is not the view of one paper, it was a general view. And this was days before the 1990 elections. And then of course, after the elections it was a completely different view altogether. As though they knew all along that it was the NLD that had the grassroots support. So we've got quite used to that now. The ups and downs of news reporting."

RM: "Nobody realized in advance what the magnitude of your win would be in the 1990 elections. I suspect even NLD people never thought you would win that many seats."

ASSK: "We did. I think, I can prove it. I had actually written to somebody to say that I was sure that we would win at least 75% of the seats. And I think there were others who knew that too."

RM: "You've taken this position even against humanitarian aid?"

ASSK: "What stand against humanitarian aid?"

RM: "People donating medical products and injectables and so on."

ASSK: "No, we haven't. Now this is the problem, people never go into these things thoroughly. What we said about humanitarian aid is that we are not against it. But we want it properly monitored so that it is given equally to everybody and not just to those who are favored by the authorities. And that the aid should not be used by the authorities as part of the propaganda machine."

RM: "But no developing country can ever guarantee aid won't be misued in some way. So they can't guarantee that here, and so because of your stance it doesn't come in and again the people suffer."

ASSK: "Well, some can come in, and some has done so. I mean, the way with certain United Nations agency projects, we have agreed that they were doing good and that it was being properly monitored and they are going ahead. There are others to which we have objected on the grounds that they were helping the regime. For example, there were certain projects where it was arranged for members of the regime's USDA United Solidarity & Development Association to be sent on courses abroad for observatory holidays and things like that. And we would object to this because this is obviously playing into the hands of the SPDC. But we have never said that we are against humanitarian aid per se. And we've never said that all NGOs should leave Burma or not come in. Or anything like that."

RM: "So again there seems to be a wrong perception since many people say: Suu Kyi won't even let humanitarian aid in, they even mention examples, some injectables."

ASSK: "Well, nobody even asked us what do we feel about them donating whatever it is. And if they had asked us we would probably have said: well, that's fine provided you make sure it is given to everybody in an even-handed way and that it's not given to the USDA. For example, if you're going to distribute milk powder we certainly don't want the USDA to be the organization through which this milk powder is distributed. Because then that would become a political rather than a humanitarian project."

RM: "But surely at least people would get the milk powder anyway?"

ASSK: "Well, depends who. The people might not get the milk powder, the families of the USDA might get the milk powder and some of it might well go onto the market. A diplomat admitted to me that he had actually seen some medicines donated by his country in a shop. I think there was a certain symbol which indicated that this was part of a load of medicines donated for humanitarian purposes. But where did those medicines end up: in a private pharmacy. There is a lot of that going on. This is what we want to guard against."

RM: "After six years house arrest, you now have limited freedom. But people say you don't travel about the city much."

ASSK: "Why should I? What for? I mean, I do go around. But I don't go out just in order to be seen going out. I go out when there is reason for me to go out. We always go to NLD functions, that is to say, you know, for example, if any member of the NLD dies, we always rally round and organize the funeral and religious rites and so on. On these occasions I do go. And I do go to certain social functions, family affairs and so on. But I don't go walkabout just for the sake of going walkabout if that is what they mean. I do go to the pagoda occasionally."

RM: "And within Yangon city you are fairly unrestricted?"

ASSK: "Yes. I don't go shopping very often, I took my son shopping the other day. But I really don't have much to shop for. Because what would I shop for? I live at home. I don't have family here so I don't have a family to shop for."

RM: "How do you feel about being called tags like the 'champion of democracy' and the 'heroine of Burma' and so on?"

ASSK: "I don't take them really too seriously. The tags change all the time, don't they."

RM: "But you are one of the few figures who are recognized all over the world."

ASSK: "I don't think so. I think there are many others who are supposed to be champions of certain causes, not necessarily just democracy."

RM: "But in the context of being a champion fighting against great odds, you're seen as comparable to the Dalai Lama."

ASSK: "Well, I don't think anything particular about it. For me it is just a job that has to be done."

RM: "Not a martyr?"

ASSK: "No. No, I don't have a martyr complex. What you need are workers, not martyrs."

RM: "You did say at one time that you had no ill feelings toward the military for putting you under house arrest, 'I do have a soft spot for the Myanmar army, it's because of my father,' you said."

ASSK: "Yes, I don't hold it against them because they put me under house arrest."

RM: "No bitterness?"

ASSK: "No. Why? It's part of the job. You know."

RM: "People say this intractable impasse has become worse because it has become personalized. That there appears to be personal animosity between the principals on both sides."

ASSK: "Which principals?"

RM: "Yourself and -"

ASSK: "And who? That's when they say the regime leaders and then one is not quite sure who is actually the dominant leader of the regime. So that's also only speculative. If they mean me and all the SPDC, then it's not personal any more, is it. Because it's all of them."

RM: "Okay, you and General Khin Nyunt."

ASSK: "Khin Nyunt, I don't even know him. I've met him one, two, three times. And we haven't had enough dealings with people to be able to say that there's a personal animosity between us. I don't know if there is on his side, but certainly not on mine. It's very difficult to have a personal animosity against somebody whom you've only met two or three times under rather formal circumstances."

RM: "But based on that limited experience with him?"

ASSK: "No, there was no grounds for personal animosity at all. We don't like in the least bit what the MI Military Intelligence, which Khin Nyunt heads are doing, but that's not personal. It's the MI as an organization and it's actions that we object to. It's not to do with Khin Nyunt as a person."

RM: "Under the right circumstances you feel you could work with him?"

ASSK: "I don't know whether I can get along with him or not, but there's no reason why we should not be able to get work done if there is work to be done together."

RM: "He has been termed the 'prince of darkness' by some publications."

ASSK: "I don't know why. I think military intelligence organizations everywhere are terrible. They go in for torture and oppression and a whole lot of nastiness, so as somebody who represents such an organization I suppose you can call him all sorts of things but I think expressions like the 'prince of darkness' are rather too dramatic."

RM: "The domestic media in these critical articles about you, refer to you as the 'bogadaw' - it means the foreigner, doesn't it?"

ASSK: "Oh, I think it means the wife of a white man. Well, I am the wife of an Englishman."

RM: "They cast doubts on your citizenship because you lived abroad, mostly in England, for such a long time. Are you a Burmese citizen?"

ASSK: "Yes, I am a Burmese citizen."

RM: "Do you have a British passport?"

ASSK: "No, I don't. I have never had one. I think that upsets them, that I've never held any other nationality except Burmese. I think they would be very happy if they could say that I had ever been a citizen of another country."

RM: "The government says that you showed little interest in your country when you lived abroad, you never reported to the embassy in London and so forth. That effectively you turned your back on Burma for 20 odd years."

ASSK: "They can say whatever they like. For example, they say I didn't register my children at the embassy of Burma in London. And I was amused because it's precisely because I registered my children at the embassy that they thought of saying that I didn't. Some of the things they say are just downright lies. They say my husband moved from a small house in England into a huge one which he bought with the money that I got from my Nobel Prize. When in fact he moved from a whole house into an apartment at the top of a bigger house. Because an apartment house is obviously much more bigger than a family home. And they knew it was a lie, but they kept saying it deliberately."

RM: "Do you still feel bitter about the way they refused to let your husband visit you in Myanmar before he died?"

ASSK: "I don't discuss family matters."

RM: "Why not?"

ASSK: "Because I want my family to be able to maintain their privacy. And people are interested in me for the politics that I'm doing so let's stick to that."

RM: "But in the democratic world it's a fact of life for public figures to have aspects of their private life made public."

ASSK: "This is not a democratic world in which I'm living."

RM: "But if it became one you'd have to discuss your private life."

ASSK: "Well, it depends on what you mean by having to discuss it. I don't think there is a requirement as such. You can choose to discuss it or choose not to."

RM: "Your health is good?"

ASSK: "It's fine."

RM: "Are you rich?"

ASSK: "No. But I'm all right. I'm not rich, I have earnings from my books royalities which by Burmese standards are good. But compared to the members of SPDC I'm nothing like wealthy."

RM: "You are legally secretary-general of the NLD?"

ASSK: "Yes."

RM: "The regime says not."

ASSK: "Yes, they have no right to say that. According to the rules of the multi-party democracy elections commission, it's for the political parties to decide what they do in their own internal affairs."

RM: "Are you going to leave the country?"

ASSK: "No. Why should I?"

RM: "You would never take a trip because you are fearful they would not allow you back?"

ASSK: "Oh, well, there will come a time when I will be able to take a trip without worrying about whether I can come back."

RM: "Some people, other journalists and diplomats, told me that you are thin-skinned and get upset at certain questions."

ASSK: "Why? I have met many journalists, and they all ask the same sort of questions you want to ask. And the only ones I consistently refuse to answer is anything about my family. Otherwise it is a journalist's job to ask questions. Whether or not the interviewee likes the question is another matter. There are diplomats with whom I disagree. And if I don't agree with them, I say so. They say so, too. Which is fair enough. But I've met so many journalists that if I were to be upset every time they asked me a question that was not exactly what I wanted I'd have to be upset all the time. I've never heard of anybody ever being asked to be tactful about my feelings. I mean, I take it for granted that politicians are there to be asked questions however awkward the questions may be."